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Import-Export and ‘And’*
MATTHEW MANDELKERN
All Souls College, Oxford
Import-Export says that a conditional of the form pp[ ðq[ rÞq is always equivalent to the corresponding
conditional pðp ^ qÞ[ rq. I argue that Import-Export does not sit well with a classical approach to con-
junction: given some plausible and widely accepted principles about conditionals, Import-Export together
with classical conjunction leads to absurd consequences. My main goal is to draw out these surprising con-
nections. In concluding, I argue that the best response to these facts is to reject Import-Export and adopt
instead a limited version of that principle which better ﬁts natural language data, still accounts for the intu-
itions that motivate Import-Export, and sits more easily with a classical conjunction.
1. Introduction
Gibbard (1981) showed that Modus Ponens and Import-Export—two prima facie plausible
principles about natural language conditionals—do not happily co-exist: theorists of the con-
ditional must pledge allegiance to at most one of these, if they do not want to interpret the nat-
ural language conditional as the material conditional. McGee (1985) showed that there is
good reason to take seriously the possibility that Modus Ponens (MP) is false and Import-
Export (IE) true. Neglected in the subsequent literature has been the fact that adopting IE has
striking consequences for a seemingly unrelated issue: the semantics of conjunction. In this
paper I argue that IE does not sit well with the classical Boolean semantics for ‘and’: if we
adopt IE together with some attractive and widely accepted principles about the conditional,
then the classical rules of conjunction introduction and elimination cannot be valid.
My main goal is to point out the surprising relation between IE and ‘and’. In conclud-
ing, however, I will suggest that the right conclusion to draw about the conditional is that
it does not validate IE in full generality, but rather validates a slightly weaker principle,
which I argue better ﬁts the natural language data; accounts for all the intuitions that
motivate IE in the ﬁrst place; and sits more easily with a classical conjunction.
2. Modus Ponens and Import-Export
Let us work with a toy language L containing arbitrarily many atomic sentences and closed
under the one-place operator ‘¬’ and two-place connectives ‘^’, ‘[’, and ‘’. I use capital
* This paper owes its existence to Justin Khoo, who ﬁrst pointed out to me the surprising connection
between Import-Export and ‘and’. I am grateful to Justin Khoo, and to David Boylan, Daniel Rothschild,
Ian Rumﬁtt, and an anonymous referee for this journal for very helpful discussion and comments.
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italics to range over atoms in the language, lower-case italics to range over arbitrary sentences
of the language and lower-case Greek letters to range over propositions (sets of possible
worlds). ‘^’ and ‘¬’ are intended to correspond to ‘and’ and ‘not’, as usual. pp[ qq corre-
sponds to the natural language conditional p If p, then qq (on either its indicative or subjunctive
reading; everything I say here goes for both kinds of conditional, modulo the points in Footnote
24). And pp  qq corresponds to the material conditional, given its standard semantics:
pp  qq is true just in case p is false or q true.1 Call the fragment of our language without ‘[’
the conditional-free fragment, or LCF for brevity. We assume a stock of possible worlds W
and a valuation function I which takes atomic sentences to subsets ofW.2 Let spt f1;f2...fn;w be
the truth-value of p at w relative to the sequence of parameters hf1, f2. . .fni (speciﬁed differently
in the various theories we will explore), and let spt f1;f2...fn be the proposition p expresses at
hf1; f2. . .fni (the set of possible worlds where p is true relative to hf1; f2. . .fni, i.e.
fw 2 W : spt f1;f2...fn;w ¼ 1g). We assume that for all atoms A, sAt f1;f2...fn ¼ IðAÞ. Finally, in
addition toW, we have an absurd world k at which every sentence in the language is true.
Our two key principles about the conditional run as follows. (‘c’ ranges over contexts,
which are sequences of parameters—again, speciﬁed differently in different semantic theories
we will explore—provided by concrete speech situations for the evaluation of modal content.)
Modus Ponens (MP): 8c : 8p; q 2 L : ðsptc \ sp[ qtcÞ  sqtc
Import-Export (IE): 8c : 8p; q; r 2 L : sp[ ðq[ rÞtc ¼ sðp ^ qÞ[ rtc
MP says, for instance, that if both ‘It is raining’ and ‘If it is raining, the picnic is can-
celled’ are true, then ‘The picnic is cancelled’ is also true; and likewise that if both ‘It
rained yesterday’ and ‘If it had rained yesterday, the picnic would have been cancelled’
are true, then ‘The picnic was cancelled’ is also true. And IE says, for instance, that ‘If
the picnic was cancelled, then if Mark was excited for the picnic, he was disappointed’
always expresses the same thing (in a given context) as ‘If the picnic was cancelled and
Mark was excited for the picnic, he was disappointed’; likewise that ‘If the picnic had
been cancelled, then if Mark had been excited for the picnic, he would have been disap-
pointed’ always expresses the same thing in a given context as ‘If the picnic had been
cancelled and Mark had been excited for the picnic, he would have been disappointed’.
Both these principles are prima facie very natural. But Gibbard (1981) showed that
these two principles entail that the natural language conditional is the material condi-
tional, provided we also assume that for any c, if sptc  sqtc, then sp[ qtc ¼ W; i.e.
when p entails q, pp[ qq is a theorem. This latter assumption, which I call Conditional
Deduction, seems essentially beyond reproach.3 Brieﬂy, Gibbard’s proof goes as follows
1 I leave disjunction out of the story, for simplicity. We could deﬁne it as usual out of negation and con-
junction; or, if we opt for a non-classical conjunction, we could combine that with a classical disjunction,
giving up de Morgan equivalences.
2 I will write e.g. ‘A(w)¼1’ or ‘A(w)¼0’ to indicate w 2 IðAÞ or w 62 IðAÞ.
3 At least when p and q are conditional-free. It would be more in the spirit of the theories we are exploring
here to state Conditional Deduction with q relativized to a context parameter updated with p—PM and PK
do not actually validate Conditional Deduction as stated here when q contains a conditional, since, as I
discuss below, pp[ pq is not a theorem for them when p is in the conditional fragment—but this will not
affect present interests, as Gibbard’s result, and those we explore below, are decisive even if we focus on
conditional-free p and q. One grounds for rejecting Conditional Deduction even in that case comes from
theorists of conditionals with impossible antecedents who argue that for some inconsistent p and some q,
pp[ qq is false, but nonetheless p entails q; see Nolan 1997. I will not explore this possibility here.
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(following presentation in Khoo 2013): for any context c and sentences p, q, under the
assumption that p:p ^ pq is nowhere true,4 it follows that s:p ^ ptc  sqtc, and thus by
Conditional Deduction that sð:p ^ pÞ[ qtc ¼ W, and thus, by IE, that
s:p[ ðp[ qÞtc ¼ W. By MP, it follows that s:ptc  sp[ qtc. Next, under the
assumption that sq ^ ptc  sqtc,5 we know by Conditional Deduction that
sðq ^ pÞ[ qtc ¼ W. By IE, sq[ ðp[ qÞtc ¼ W. By MP, sqtc  sp[ qtc. Given the
meaning of the material conditional ‘’, on which, again, sp  qtc ¼ s:ptc [ sqtc, it
follows by set theory that sp  qtc  sp[ qtc. MP guarantees that
sp[ qtc  sp  qtc. Thus 8c : 8p; q 2 L : sp[ qtc ¼ sp  qtc: that is, the natural lan-
guage conditional ‘[’ is the material conditional ‘’.
The problem is that ‘[’ is not the material conditional. This is almost universally
accepted by those who study conditionals.6 A quick argument: if ‘[’ were the material
conditional, then the negation of pp[ qq would entail p. But it does not. For instance,
(1) is true whether or not Patch turns out to be a rabbit:
(1) It’s not the case that, if Patch is a rabbit, she is a rodent. (Khoo & Mandelkern
2018)
That is, (1) does not entail that Patch is a rabbit—contrary to the predictions of a theory
which said that the indicative conditional in (1) is the material conditional. It is equally
clear, for parallel reasons, that the subjunctive conditional is not the material conditional,
since (2) clearly does not entail that Patch is a rabbit.
(2) It’s not the case that, if Patch had been a rabbit, she would have been a rodent.
Arguments like this can be easily multiplied, though I will stop here, since the point is
well established: ‘[’ is not ‘’. Given the plausibility of Conditional Deduction, the con-
sensus is that we must therefore validate at most one of MP and IE.7
Again, both principles are prima facie plausible. There is much to say in favor of, and
against, both. I will not go into the details of this debate here. My main goal in this
paper is not to argue for either of these principles, but rather to point out some down-
stream consequences of one possible choice between them, namely the choice to go with
IE. McGee (1985), as we will review in more detail below, argued that there is reason to
take seriously the possibility that MP is invalid and IE is valid; and Khoo & Mandelkern
4 As we discuss below, p:p ^ pq can be true in the PK or PM semantics given below, in particular when
p is itself a conditional; even in those frameworks, though, p:p ^ pq is never true when p is conditional-
free, and so even in those frameworks, Gibbard’s result will show that pp[ qq is equivalent to pp  qq
whenever p itself is conditional-free, provided MP, IE, and Conditional Deduction are all valid.
5 We will call into question right conjunction elimination below, but not left.
6 Some, like Lewis (1976), Jackson (1979), Grice (1989), Rieger (2006), have argued that contrasts in
assertability between material conditionals and indicative conditionals can be explained pragmatically.
But these accounts, even if successful, would not explain embedding data like (1). Moreover, to my
knowledge no one has defended the thesis that the subjunctive conditional is the material conditional; but
Gibbard’s proof is prima facie just as worrisome for the subjunctive conditional as for the indicative
(since, at ﬁrst blush, both seem to validate Conditional Deduction, MP, and IE).
7 Kratzer (1986) claims to evade Gibbard’s proof by challenging an implicit premise—that ‘[’ is a two-
place operator—but Khoo (2013) shows persuasively that this does not in fact allow Kratzer to avoid
Gibbard’s result, and that she does so because, and only because, she invalidates MP.
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(2018) argue that the subsequent literature has not produced a convincing counterexample
to IE, at least for indicative conditionals. So it at least seems open, given the present state
of the literature, that IE is valid and MP invalid; and this sufﬁces to motivate exploration
of the consequences of validating IE.
3. Validating Import-Export
There are a number of theories which validate IE. I will spell out three representative the-
ories—one from the literature, and two close variations on existing theories—to focus
our investigation here. The ﬁrst is due to McGee 1985. McGee builds on Stalnaker
(1968), Stalnaker & Thomason (1970)’s theory of conditionals, which validates MP, not
IE. McGee modiﬁes the theory so that it validates IE, not MP. On McGee’s theory, sen-
tences of our language are evaluated relative to two modal parameters. The ﬁrst is a Stal-
nakerian selection function f from propositions and worlds to worlds, which (i) takes any
proposition and world to a world where that proposition is true (intuitively, the ‘closest’
world where that proposition is true); (ii) takes a proposition and world to the absurd
world k just in case the proposition in question is inconsistent; (iii) takes hφ,wi and hw,
wi to the same world if f (φ,w) 2 w and f (w,w) 2 φ; and (iv) takes hφ,wi to w just in
case w 2 φ. The second parameter is a hypothesis set: a set of sentences Γ, which will
serve to keep track of conditional antecedents. Context will always supply an empty
hypothesis set; the only role of the hypothesis set is to keep track of intra-sentential
dynamics in conditionals.8 Then we have the following semantic rules:
McGee Semantics:
• sAt f ;C;w ¼ 1 iff f ðT
p2C
spt f ;£;wÞ 2 IðAÞ
• s:pt f ;C;w ¼ 1 iff spt f ;C;w ¼ 0
• sp ^ qt f ;C;w ¼ 1 iff spt f ;C;w ¼ 1 and sqt f ;C;w ¼ 1
• sp[ qt f ;C;w ¼ sqt f ;C[fpg;w
Relative to an empty hypothesis set, atomic sentences, negation, and conjunction have
their standard classical interpretations. The role of ‘if’-clauses in conditionals is solely
to add material to the hypothesis set: the conditional’s consequent is then evaluated
relative to an updated hypothesis set which includes its antecedent. The members of
the hypothesis set are each interpreted relative to the matrix selection function and an
empty hypothesis set; their intersection then serves as an argument for a Stalnakerian
selection function. For simple conditionals—conditionals of the form pp[ qq where
p; q 2 LCF (the conditional-free fragment)—the resulting logic coincides with Stal-
naker’s: pp[ qq is true just in case the closest p world is a q world. But for com-
plex conditionals, the accounts diverge: in McGee’s system, a conditional of the form
pp[ ðq[ rÞq is true just in case pq[ rq is true relative to a hypothesis set to which
8 All these conditions are left implicit in McGee’s own presentation, but I assume they are intended. Quan-
tiﬁcation over contexts throughout is thus just quantiﬁcation over selection functions, since the hypothesis
set remains empty in all contexts. Likewise for PM and PK, mutatis mutandis.
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p has been added, just in case r is true relative to a hypothesis set to which p and q
have both been added. This renders pp[ ðq[ rÞq equivalent to pðp ^ qÞ[ rq, suf-
ﬁcing to validate IE. By contrast, MP will not be valid: an easy way to see this is
that pp[ ð:p[ rÞq will always be true, for any p and r; but there are worlds where
p is true and p:p[ rq false.
The second theory I explore here is a close variant on McGee’s theory, which I’ll call
Pseudo-McGee (PM), and runs as follows. The modal parameters in this case are a selec-
tion function, as above, plus a premise set Φ: a set of propositions, which again we
assume always starts out empty, and whose only role, again, is to keep track of the intra-
sentential dynamics of information.
Pseudo-McGee Semantics:
• sAt f ;U;w ¼ 1 iff f ðTU;wÞ 2 IðAÞ
• s:pt f ;U;w ¼ 1 iff spt f ;U;w ¼ 0
• sp ^ qt f ;U;w ¼ 1 iff spt f ;U;w ¼ 1 and sqt f ;U[fspt
f ;Ug;w ¼ 1
• sp[ qt f ;U;w ¼ sqt f ;U[fspt
f ;Ug;w
This semantics is exactly like McGee’s, except that what gets added to our modal param-
eters as we process a conditional is a proposition, not a sentence. This means that what
gets added to premise sets are the denotations of sentences interpreted relative to their
local premise sets, rather than uninterpreted sentences which will ultimately be interpreted
relative to an empty premise set. This makes a crucial difference when it comes to
importing and exporting a sentence which is itself a conditional, since what will get
added to the premise set will be the conditional as interpreted relative to a non-empty
premise set. Thus, in order to validate IE in that case, we must adopt the non-classical
conjunction here, which ensures that a right conjunct is evaluated relative to a premise
set updated with the content of the left conjunct. MP will be invalid; the same example
which showed this for McGee will show this for PM.
The ﬁnal theory I will put on the table here is due to Kratzer (1981, 1986), augmented
with a conjunction along the lines suggested in Khoo & Mandelkern 2018; call this the-
ory Pseudo-Kratzer (PK). This theory again has two modal parameters. The ﬁrst is a
modal base function g that takes each world to a set of propositions. The role of the
modal base, like hypothesis and premise sets, is to keep track of information in condi-
tionals; we thus again assume that any context provides a modal base which takes every
world to the empty set. The second element is a function  from worlds to well-founded
partial pre-orders on worlds such that for any world w, w is strictly minimal in ðwÞ.9
Finally, this approach augments our language with a covert modal ‘M’.10 Then:
9 My presentation simpliﬁes Kratzer’s in moving directly to a pre-order rather than going by way of an
ordering source, and in assuming that ðwÞ is well-founded for all w (the limit assumption). Both of
these simpliﬁcations are harmless for present purposes. I also assume (the model-theoretic version of)
strong centering, which is necessary for proving some of the facts below.
10
‘M’ counts as part of the conditional fragment of our language, so LCF does not contain ‘M’.
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Pseudo-Kratzer Semantics:
• sAtg;;w ¼ 1 iff w 2 IðAÞ
• s:ptg;;w ¼ 1 iff sptg;;w ¼ 0





is the smallest function such that 8w0 : gpg;ðw0Þ ¼ gðw0Þ [ fsptg;g
• sp[ qtg;;w ¼ sqtgp
g;
;;w
• smðpÞtg;;w ¼ 1 iff 8w0 2 T gðwÞ : w0 is minimal in gðwÞ ! sptg;;w
0 ¼ 1,
where gðwÞ is the limitation of (w) to
T
g(w)11
Atoms and negation are treated classically. The only role of a conditional antecedent is to add
its information to the modal base (much as in McGee’s theory). Crucially, Kratzer assumes
that conditionals without overt modals (which is to say all conditionals in our language, which
does not contain overt modals) always contain the covert modal ‘M’ which takes scope over
everything which follows the most deeply embedded ‘[’ in the conditional; thus e.g. where r
does not contain ‘M’ or ‘[’, instead of pp[ rq we will have pp[mrq; likewise, instead of
pp[ ðq[ rÞq we will have pp[ ðq[mrÞq. pmpq is true just in case p is true at all the min-
imal worlds in the intersection of the value of the modal base. Putting this all together, simple
conditionals of the form pp[mqq will be true just in case all the minimal p worlds consistent
with the value of the modal base are q worlds.12 When it comes to complex conditionals, the
clause for conditionals, together with the assumption about covert modals, ensures that we
keep track of consecutive antecedents, just as for McGee and PM. So pp[ ðq[mrÞq will be
true just in case pq[mrq is true relative to a modal base which includes the information that
p is true, which holds just in case r is true at all the minimal worlds where p and q are true.
When q is conditional-free, this sufﬁces to guarantee that pp[ ðq[mrÞq is equivalent to
pðp ^ qÞ[mrq. And our clause for conjunction ensures that right conjuncts are evaluated rel-
ative to a modal base which includes the information in the left conjunct. This, in turn, suf-
ﬁces to validate IE in full generality, even when q is a conditional (more below). MP, by
contrast, will not be valid; the same example given above shows this.
All three of these theories, then, validate IE. They differ in a variety of ways, but what
I want to focus on here is their treatment of ‘and’. McGee’s theory has a classical ‘and’.
But PM and PK give ‘and’ a decidedly non-classical treatment. On both those theories,
‘and’ is fully classical for the conditional-free fragment; but not when we have a con-
junction whose right conjunct contains a conditional. Then the conditional is evaluated,
in PM, relative to a premise set updated with the left conjunct; and, in PK, relative to a
modal base which is updated with the left conjunct. To illustrate this divergence in their
treatment of ‘and’, consider the conjunction pp ^ ð:p[ qÞq for any conditional-free p.
In McGee’s theory, this conjunction is true relative to hf, Γ, wi just in case both p and
p:p[ qq are true relative to hf, Γ, wi, just as we would expect from a classical point of
11
‘!’ is the meta-language material conditional.
12 The resulting semantics for simple conditionals is a slight generalization of the one given in Lewis 1973
for subjunctive conditionals.
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view. Consider next PK. We assume that in a conjunction like this, q has the form pmrq.
The conjunction pp ^ ð:p[mrÞq is then true relative to hg;;wi just in case p is true
relative to hg;;wi and p:p[mrq is true relative to a different point of evaluation,
namely hgpg; ;;wi. And now notice something important: p:p[mrq is always true rel-
ative to any point of evaluation which contains gp
g;
as its modal base parameter, no
matter what g is, and no matter what  and w are. This is because
s:p[mrtgp
g;
;;w ¼ 1 just in case all ðwÞ-minimal worlds in a certain set make r true
—but what set? We get that set by taking the intersection of g(w), then intersecting that
with the intension of p, and then intersecting that with the intension of p:pq. Whatever
we started with, we’ll end with the empty set. And so the quantiﬁcation here ends up vac-
uous, and p:p[mrq is guaranteed to be true. That means that in PK, pp ^ ð:p[mrÞq is
true at an index just in case p is. And that, of course, means that ‘and’ is highly non-clas-
sical in this system. In particular, right conjunction elimination will be invalid: the truth of
p at an index will sufﬁce for the truth of pp ^ ð:p[mrÞq, but not for the truth of
p:p[mrq.13 Conjunction introduction will also be invalid, for similar reasons: we can
have p and pq[mrq both true relative to some index, while pp ^ ðq[mrÞq is false rela-
tive to that same index, since in the conjunction, the right conjunct is evaluated relative to
a shifted modal base (intuitively: for the conjunction to be true we would need not only p
and pq[mrq to be true, but also for pðp ^ qÞ[mrq to be true; and the truth of the latter
does not follow from the truth of the former two in a variably strict framework like PK).14
Things are parallel for PM: pp ^ ð:p[ qÞq will be true relative to any index just in case
p is, for the right conjunct will be evaluated relative to a premise set updated with p;
which means that q will be evaluated relative to the closest world which makes both p
and p:pq true; which means it will be evaluated relative to the absurd world, which
makes everything true. So right conjunction elimination will be invalid. And conjunction
introduction will likewise be invalid, for parallel reasons.
That a non-classical ‘and’ is required in order for theories like Kratzer’s to validate IE
was ﬁrst pointed out to me by Justin Khoo (p.c.), and ﬁrst observed in the literature, to my
knowledge, in Khoo & Mandelkern 2018. But why do PK and PM need a non-classical
‘and’ to validate IE? The intuition is the following. In both these theories, IE is validated
because we keep track of the information in the antecedents of conditionals in our modal
parameters as we process a conditional; when we have nested conditionals, we evaluate
each successive antecedent relative to the information contained in the antecedents we have
already processed. But that means that if we want to validate IE in full generality, conjunc-
tion must keep track of this information in exactly the same way. In other words, we evalu-
ate q in pp[ ðq[ rÞq relative to modal parameters that include the information that p is
true; if IE is to be valid for the case in which q is itself a conditional, we must likewise eval-
uate q in pðp ^ qÞ[ rq relative to modal parameters that are updated with p.
For an illustration, consider a conditional of the form pp[ ðð:p[ qÞ[ rÞq, with p
and q conditional-free.15 For both PM and PK, the second embedded conditional here,
13 Left conjunction elimination remains valid.
14 For a countermodel, consider a model with three possible worlds, x, y, z. Assume p, q, r are atoms. Let
gðzÞ ¼£; let ðzÞ be the total order hz, x, yi; and let p(z) ¼ 1, q(z) ¼ 0, q(x) ¼ r(x) ¼ 1, p(x) ¼ 0, q
(y) ¼ p(y) ¼ 1, r(y) ¼ 0. Then p and pq[mrq are both true at hg;; zi, but their conjunction is not.
15 In PK, we of course assume that q and r have the form pmsq and pmtq for some conditional-free and
modal-free s and t. Likewise, mutatis mutandis, throughout what follows.
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p:p[ qq, is interpreted relative to modal parameters that include the information that p
is true, and thus is trivially true. It follows that, in PM and PK, pp[ ðð:p[ qÞ[ rÞq is
equivalent to pp[ rq. Now IE tells us that pp[ ðð:p[ qÞ[ rÞq is semantically equiva-
lent to pðp ^ ð:p[ qÞÞ[ rq. But, if we were to adopt all the semantic entries in PK or
PM together with a classical ‘and’, then the latter would not be equivalent to pp[ rq,
since the right conjunct of the antecedent of pðp ^ ð:p[ qÞÞ[ rq would not be inter-
preted relative to modal parameters that are updated with sptc, and so the right conjunct
of the antecedent would not be at all trivial. This just follows from the fact that, if ‘and’
is classical, then pp ^ ð:p[ qÞq is not equivalent to p. And so pðp ^ ð:p[ qÞÞ[ rq
would not, after all, be equivalent to pp[ ðð:p[ qÞ[ rÞq: PK or PM amended so that
it has a classical conjunction will invalidate IE when what is imported/exported is itself a
conditional. By contrast, with the non-classical semantics for conjunction given above,
both theories will, again, validate IE in full generality.
This makes it clear why PK and PM need a non-classical conjunction to validate IE.
It also raises the converse question: how does McGee validate IE with a classical con-
junction? McGee, like PK and PM, validates IE by stipulating that when we process a
conditional with multiple antecedents, we keep track of the information in all the antece-
dents as we go, evaluating the consequent in light of all that information. But crucially,
in McGee’s semantics, we don’t evaluate that information as we go, taking into account
earlier information. Rather, we just keep track of all the sentences which are antecedents
of the conditional, and then evaluate each on its own, relative to the empty hypothesis
set. More concretely, consider pp[ ðq[ rÞq. Rather than evaluating q relative to a
hypothesis set which includes the information that p is true, and then evaluating r relative
to a hypothesis set that includes the information that p is true and that q is true, we eval-
uate both p and q relative to the empty hypothesis set, and then evaluate r relative to the
information derived that way. This means that we don’t take into account p when evalu-
ating q in pp[ ðq[ rÞq; rather, q is evaluated as it would be when unembedded. This
means that, in pp[ ððq[ rÞ[ sÞq, pq[ rq is evaluated the same way as when unem-
bedded—it is evaluated relative to an empty hypothesis set—and thus it is evaluated in
the same way as when it appears in pðp ^ ðq[ rÞÞ[ sq, where ‘^’ has classical seman-
tics. This means that McGee can validate IE in full generality with a classical conjunc-
tion. In particular, in pp[ ðð:p[ qÞ[ rÞq, the embedded conditional p:p[ qq will
not be trivial—because it won’t be evaluated relative to a hypothesis set updated with p
—and so the whole conditional will not be equivalent to pp[ rq, but will be equivalent
to pðp ^ ð:p[ qÞÞ[ rq, where ‘^’ has classical semantics.
PM and PK thus need a non-classical conjunction to validate IE; McGee manages to
validate IE with a classical conjunction. Let me note, moreover, that PM and PK are the
rule, not the exception: as far as I know, McGee’s theory is the only extant theory of
conditionals which validates IE with a classical conjunction. Every other theory I know
of requires a non-classical ‘and’ along the lines of the conjunction in PM and PK in
order to validate IE.
4. Nothing Added
Good for McGee and bad for PM and PK, we might think. Classical conjunction has
many things going for it. If we want to validate IE, then (it is natural to think) we should
do so without introducing excessive weirdness elsewhere in our semantics.
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But this response is overhasty. Adopting IE together with a classical conjunction
forces us to invalidate other plausible principles about the conditional. This counts
against any approach which aims to validate IE while keeping conjunction classical. (In
the end I will argue that the best response is not to accept PM/PK’s non-classical con-
junctions, but rather to reject IE in favor of a more limited principle; but more on that to
come.)
I will discuss two principles in particular which we cannot reasonably validate if
we adopt IE together with a classical conjunction. I call the ﬁrst principle Nothing
Added:
Nothing Added: 8p;q; r 2L : ð8c : sp[qtc ¼WÞ! ð8c : sp[ ðq[ rÞtc ¼ sp[ rtcÞ
Nothing Added says that, when pp[ qq is a theorem, then pp[ ðq[ rÞq will always
express the same thing as pp[ rq. The principle is very natural. Intuitively, if pp[ qq
is a theorem, then q tells us nothing beyond what p already tells us; but then
pp[ ðq[ rÞq should have just the same status as pp[ rq.
But it turns out that, given some anodyne background assumptions, if we validate both
Nothing Added and IE together with classical conjunction, we arrive at absurd conclu-
sions. As an illustration to begin, note that McGee does not validate Nothing Added. For
McGee, pp[ ð:p[ qÞq is a theorem, since q will be true relative to any hypothesis set
which includes both p and p:pq. Nothing Added would then say that, for any r,
pp[ ðð:p[ qÞ[ rÞq is equivalent to pp[ rq. But these are inequivalent in McGee’s
semantics. For instance, let p, q, and r be arbitrary different atoms. Suppose we evaluate
pp[ ðð:p[ qÞ[ rÞq and pp[ rq relative to a selection function f, an empty hypothesis
set, and a world w where both p and r are true. pp[ rq will be true at this index no mat-
ter what (thanks to the fourth constraint on selection functions). But now suppose that
f ðspt f ;£ \ s:p[ qt f ;£;wÞ ¼ w0 6¼ w, and suppose that r(w0) ¼ 0 (these assumptions
are perfectly consistent). Then pp[ ðð:p[ qÞ[ rÞq will be false at h f ;£;wi. Since
pp[ rq is true at h f ;£;wi, it follows that pp[ ðð:p[ qÞ[ rÞq is not equivalent to
pp[ rq.
So Nothing Added is not valid in McGee’s semantics—whereas, by contrast, Nothing
Added is valid in PM and PK.16 This divergence is not an accident: given two innocuous
background assumptions, validating IE and Nothing Added while keeping conjunction
classical leads us to absurd consequences. Those assumptions are, ﬁrst, Conditional
Deduction, the principle adverted to in Gibbard’s proof which says that if p entails q,
then pp[ qq is a theorem; and, second, a principle I’ll call Equivalence:
Equivalence: 8p; q 2 L : ð8c : 8r 2 L : sp[ rtc ¼ sq[ rtcÞ ! 8c : sptc ¼ sqtc
16 The proof in PM is as follows. Suppose 8f : sp[ qt f ;£ ¼ W. Then 8f : spt f ;£  sqt f ;fspt f ;£g.
Otherwise we would have: 9f : 9w : spt f ;£;w ¼ 1 ^ sqt f ;fspt f ;£g;w ¼ 0. But then sp[ qt f ;£;w ¼ 0,
contrary to assumption. Now 8f : sp[ ðq[ rÞt f ;£ ¼ sq[ rt f ;fspt f ;£g ¼ srt f ;fspt f ;£ ;sqt f ;fspt
f ;£gg ¼
srt f ;fspt
f ;£\sqt f ;fspt f ;£gg ¼ srt f ;fspt f ;£g ¼ sp[ rt f ;£. The proof in PK is similar. A parallel proof will
not go through for McGee’s semantics, because crucially, in McGee’s semantics (if we were to equiva-
lently reformulate it in terms of sets of propositions instead of sentences), sq[ rt f ;fspt
f ;£g is not
srt f ;fspt
f ;£ ;sqt f ;fspt
f ;£gg; rather, sq[ rt f ;fspt
f ;£g ¼ srt f ;fspt f ;£;sqt f ;£g.
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Equivalence says that, given two sentences p and q, as long as pp[ rq and pq[ rq are
semantically equivalent no matter what r is, then p and q must be semantically equiva-
lent as well. This is a principle that is validated by every semantics I know for the condi-
tional, and has not to my knowledge been questioned in the literature.17
Now suppose we take on board IE, Nothing Added, Conditional Deduction, and
Equivalence. We also make a weak version of the classical Quodlibet assumption that, as
long as p is conditional-free, pp ^ :pq is nowhere true, and thus entails everything. Then
for any q 2 L and p 2 LCF :18
i. 8c : sðp ^ :pÞ[ qtc ¼ W Conditional Deduction, Quodlibet
ii. 8c : sp[ ð:p[ qÞtc ¼ W IE, (i)
iii. 8c : 8r 2 L : sp[ ðð:p[ qÞ[ rÞtc ¼ sp[ rtc Nothing Added, (ii)
iv. 8c : 8r 2 L : sðp ^ ð:p[ qÞÞ[ rtc
¼ sp[ ðð:p[ qÞ[ rÞtc ¼ sp[ rtc IE, (iii)
v. 8c : sptc ¼ sp ^ ð:p[ qÞtc Equivalence, (iv)
Now suppose that conjunction is classical, in particular that it validates right conjunction
elimination.19 Since from (v) we can conclude that whenever p is true, so is
pp ^ ð:p[ qÞq, right conjunction elimination then lets us conclude that p:p[ qq is also
true. In other words, we arrive at the conclusion that p entails p:p[ qq; i.e. that
8c : 8q 2 L : 8p 2 LCF : sptc  s:p[ qtc. But this conclusion is clearly false: it is, in
fact, one of the worst consequences of the material conditional analysis of the condi-
tional. For this conclusion entails that the falsity of p:p[ qq entails the falsity of p;
more succinctly (given classical negation, which is not in dispute here), the falsity of
pp[ qq entails the truth of p. Call this principle Ex Falso:
Ex Falso: 8c : 8q 2 L : 8p 2 LCF : s:ðp[ qÞtc  sptc
But Ex Falso is clearly unacceptable: as we saw above, for instance, the truth of ‘It’s not
the case that if Patch is a rabbit, she is a rodent’ does not entail that Patch is a rabbit.
Likewise for subjunctives.
In sum: Nothing Added, Conditional Deduction, Equivalence, and Quodlibet entail Ex
Falso, if ‘and’ is classical and IE is true. Ex Falso is clearly false, and Conditional
Deduction and Equivalence look hard to challenge. So if ‘and’ is classical, IE is in direct
tension with a very appealing principle, namely Nothing Added.
17 Though its converse—that conditionals with semantically equivalent antecedents are equivalent—has
been challenged; see Santorio 2018 and citations therein.
18 We limit our attention to p in the conditional-free fragment, because pp ^ :pq will not always be a con-
tradiction when p itself contains a conditional, according to PM and PK, as I discuss further below. Like-
wise in discussion of Absurdum below.
19 (v) on its own is already problematic, at least for subjunctives. I return to this point in §6.
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5. Absurdum
We ﬁnd similar tension between IE, classical ‘and’, and a principle which I’ll call
Absurdum:20
Absurdum: 8p; q 2 L : ð8c : sp[ qtc ¼£Þ ! ð8c : sp[ ðq[?Þtc ¼ WÞ
Absurdum says that if pp[ qq is inconsistent, then pp[ ðq[?Þq is a theorem. Absur-
dum is quite attractive. If pp[ qq is inconsistent, then p must somehow guarantee that q
is false—otherwise there would be some model where pp[ qq is true. So p and q must
be inconsistent. Under the assumption that p and the subsequent assumption that q, then,
anything at all will follow; and so pp[ ðq[?Þq should be a theorem.
PM and PK both validate Absurdum.21 But, again given some anodyne background
assumptions, there is no plausible way to validate Absurdum while validating IE and
keeping conjunction classical. For the sake of illustration, note ﬁrst that McGee invali-
dates Absurdum. For McGee, pp[ ð:p[ qÞq is a theorem; and so, assuming p is con-
sistent, pp[:ð:p[ qÞq is inconsistent. Then Absurdum says that
pp[ ð:ð:p[ qÞ[?Þq should be a theorem. But in McGee’s framework, it’s not. By
IE, this will be equivalent to pðp ^ :ð:p[ qÞÞ[?q. Since conjunction is classical for
McGee, the antecedent of this conditional will be consistent, and so the whole condi-
tional will be inconsistent. Thus McGee fails to validate Absurdum.
More generally, suppose we take on board the following background principles:
Theorem to Contradiction 1: 8p; q 2 L : ð8c : sptc 6¼ £ ^ sp[ qtc ¼ WÞ ! ð8c :
sp[:qtc ¼£Þ
Theorem to Contradiction 2: 8p; q 2 L : ð8c : sp[?tc ¼ WÞ ! ð8c : sptc ¼£Þ
Theorem to Contradiction 1 (TC1) says that, if p is consistent and pp[ qq is a theo-
rem, then pp[:qq is inconsistent. If p is consistent, then pp[ qq will be a theorem
only if, intuitively, the truth of p somehow guarantees the truth of q, no matter what
the world is like; but then pp[:qq will always be false. Theorem to Contradiction
2 (TC2) says that if pp[?q is a theorem, then p is inconsistent. This, again, seems
very plausible: if pp[?q is a theorem, then this means that the truth of p somehow
guarantees the truth of ’; but since ’ is never true, this can only hold if p is never
true. Indeed, TC2 follows from TC1 given the very plausible assumption that
pp[>q is consistent for any p (a principle, again, which as far as I know everyone
accepts). Suppose then that pp[?q is a theorem. If p were consistent, then, by TC1,
it would follow that pp[>q is inconsistent, contrary to our assumption. So it must
be that p is inconsistent. TC1 in turn is a close relative of Conditional Deduction.
TC1 and TC2 are validated by every semantics for the conditional I know, and seem
very plausible to me.
Now, taking these assumptions on board, consider any consistent p 2 LCF and any
q 2 L:
20 ? is an atom true only at the absurd world; > is an atom everywhere true.
21 For PM, the proof is as follows. Suppose 8f : sp[ qt f ;£ ¼£. Then 8f : spt f ;£ \ sqt f ;fspt f ;£g¼£;
else 9w : 9f : spt f ;£;w¼ sqt f ;fspt f ;£g;w ¼ 1, but then sp[ qt f ;£;w¼ 1, contrary to assumption. Then
8f : sp[ðq[?Þt f ;£¼ sq[?t f ;fspt f ;£g ¼ s?t f ;fspt f ;£ ;sqt f ;fspt
f ;£gg ¼ s?t f ;fspt f ;£\sqt f ;fspt
f ;£gg ¼ s?t f ;f£g
¼W. The proof for PK is similar.
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i. 8c : sðp ^ :pÞ[ qtc ¼ W Conditional Deduction, Quodlibet
ii. 8c : sp[ ð:p[ qÞtc ¼ W IE, (i)
iii. 8c : sp[:ð:p[ qÞtc ¼£ TC1, (ii)
iv. 8c : sp[ ð:ð:p[ qÞ[?Þtc ¼ W Absurdum, (iii)
v. 8c : sðp ^ :ð:p[ qÞÞ[?tc ¼ W IE, (iv)
vi. 8c : sp ^ :ð:p[ qÞtc ¼£ TC2, (v)
Now, if ‘and’ is classical, then from (vi) we can conclude that, whenever p is consis-
tent and in LCF , we have 8c : 8q 2 L : sptc  s:p[ qtc (otherwise we would have
that sptc is consistent with s:ð:p[ qÞtc and thus that sp ^ :ð:p[ qÞtc is consis-
tent, contrary to (vi)). The same of course holds whenever p is inconsistent; and so
we arrive again at Ex Falso. Once more, then, classical conjunction puts IE in ten-
sion with a very intuitive principle—this time Absurdum—given background assump-
tions (TC1 and TC2, together with Conditional Deduction and Quodlibet) which seem
difﬁcult to challenge.
6. Restricted Import-Export
Import-Export thus does not sit easily with classical conjunction. Given some innocuous
background assumptions, if we adopt classical conjunction, then we cannot validate IE
together with Nothing Added or with Absurdum, at risk of validating the obviously false
principle Ex Falso.
My main goal here has been to draw out the surprising connections between IE and
conjunction. There are a variety of ways we could respond to these results. Accepting Ex
Falso seems like a non-starter to me. So does rejecting one of the background assump-
tions (Conditional Deduction, Quodlibet, Equivalence, TC1, TC2), though proponents of
non-classical logics may be inclined to go that way. It seems to me, then, that we must
reject one of the following three: (i) classical conjunction, (ii) IE, and (iii) Nothing
Added; and likewise we must reject one of the following three: (i) classical conjunction,
(ii) IE, and (iii) Absurdum.
So what are we to do? In concluding, I will very brieﬂy argue that the right
response to these results is to reject IE, but on a limited basis. Let me start with some
negative remarks. Following McGee’s route—validating IE with a classical conjunc-
tion, and therefore invalidating Nothing Added and Absurdum—is prima facie unattrac-
tive insofar as those latter principles are very natural (though one could certainly deny
them).
Following PM/PK’s route—adopting a non-classical conjunction, together with IE,
Nothing Added, and Absurdum—likewise has serious drawbacks. It should be acknowl-
edged that the non-classical conjunctions under discussion behave classically except
when a right conjunct is a conditional; and they bear a close resemblance to non-classical
conjunctions which have been motivated and defended in the dynamic semantics litera-
ture on the basis of facts about anaphora, presupposition, and—most closely related to
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present considerations—epistemic modality.22 But there are serious drawbacks to follow-
ing PM/PK’s route. I will brieﬂy highlight two. The ﬁrst is that the non-classical ‘and’
advocated by PK and PM invalidates certain logical principles which seem very intuitive
in natural language, even when ‘and’ conjoins conditionals. The most prominent of these
is the principle of non-contradiction, which says that pp ^ :pq is a contradiction, for any
p. This principle is not valid in PK or PM: we will get countermodels when p itself is a
conditional. In particular, sentences of the form pððp[ qÞ[ rÞ ^ :ððp[ qÞ[ rÞq are
consistent in these frameworks (the key point is that the second, negated conditional is
interpreted relative to modal parameters updated with the ﬁrst, and thus can be false
while the ﬁrst is true, rendering the whole sentence true).23 This seems like a bad result,
one not borne out by natural language; (3) for instance seems contradictory:
(3) If the vase will break if dropped, we won’t drop it; and it’s not the case that if
the vase will break if dropped, we won’t drop it.
Second—as an anonymous referee for this journal and David Boylan have both pointed
out to me—while adopting a non-classical conjunction lets us avoid Ex Falso, adopting
IE together with Nothing Added still forces us to an unsavory conclusion, whatever con-
junction we adopt. Namely, as our ﬁrst result showed, given our background assump-
tions, these together entail that p and pp ^ ð:p[ qÞq are semantically equivalent for
conditional-free p. This conclusion on its own is difﬁcult to assess for indicative condi-
tionals, which are generally felicitous only if their antecedents are compatible with the
common ground (Stalnaker 1975); but is clearly unacceptable for subjunctive condition-
als. For instance, suppose that it’s sunny. And suppose that if it had rained the picnic
would have been cancelled. Then (4) is true and (5) false:
(4) It’s sunny, and if it had rained the picnic would have been cancelled.
(5) It’s sunny, and if it had rained the picnic would not have been cancelled.
This is contrary to our predictions if p and pp ^ ð:p[ qÞq are semantically equivalent,
in which case we predict both of these to be true. Thus IE and Nothing Added together
are already in tension, whatever conjunction we adopt, suggesting that we cannot reason-
ably validate both of them.
22 See e.g. Heim 1982, 1983, Groenendijk et al. 1996. In Mandelkern 2018a, I defend a non-classical con-
junction on the basis of considerations about epistemic modality. But that conjunction differs substantially
from the one under discussion here, both in motivation and in its logical proﬁle; in particular, unlike the
one under consideration here, that conjunction Strawson-validates all classical logical laws.
23 For an example in PK, consider a model with worlds {w, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i}, with  returning total orders
at each world, in particular ðwÞ ¼ hw; a; b; hi;ðaÞ ¼ ha; f i;ðf Þ ¼ hf ; gi;ðbÞ ¼ hb; c; di;ðcÞ ¼
hc; ei;ðhÞ ¼ hh; ii and p(a) ¼ p(c) ¼ p(d) ¼ p(e) ¼ p(f) ¼ p(g) ¼ p(i) ¼ p(h) ¼ 1, p(w) ¼ p(b) ¼ 0,
r(w) ¼ r(d) ¼ r(g) ¼ r(i) ¼ 1, r(a) ¼ r(b) ¼ r(e) ¼ 0, q(a) ¼ q(d) ¼ q(e) ¼ q(g) ¼ q(i) ¼ 1, q
(c) ¼ q(f) ¼ q(h) ¼ 0. pððp[ qÞ[ rÞ ^ :ððp[ qÞ[ rÞq will be true at w (relative to  and the modal
base g which takes each world to£). This can easily be translated into a corresponding model in PM. See
Mandelkern 2018b for a parallel result concerning dynamic ‘and’. A related issue for PM and PK is that
pp[ pq will not be a theorem; in particular, it can be false when p is a conditional (the model just presented
is a countermodel to pððp[ qÞ[ rÞ[ ððp[ qÞ[ rÞq). This issue does not have anything to do with con-
junction, and seems independently worrisome.
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Both of these options thus have clear drawbacks. There is an alternative, however. To
motivate it, a bit of review is in order. The year is 1980: the Republican American presi-
dential candidate Reagan is ahead in the polls, followed by the Democrat Carter. Well
behind both is Anderson, a second Republican. McGee (1985) noted that the following
conditional sounds clearly true in this situation:
(6) If a Republican wins the election, then if Reagan doesn’t win, Anderson will.
But the following conditional sounds clearly false (or at least very unlikely):
(7) If Reagan doesn’t win the election, Anderson will.
Since we nonetheless think it quite likely that a Republican will win the election, it looks
like it can’t be that ‘A Republican will win the election’, together with (6), entails that
(7) is true. This is McGee’s famous counterexample to MP. At the same time, McGee
noted that (6) sounds equivalent to (8):
(8) If a Republican wins the election and Reagan doesn’t win, Anderson will.
That felt equivalence counts as evidence in favor of IE.
The conclusion that IE is valid, however, is not unavoidable. Other researchers have
indeed explored IE and have found no convincing (to my mind) counterexamples to the
principle, at least for indicative conditionals.24 But, as far as I know, none of those
explorations has looked in particular at instances of IE where what is being imported or
exported itself contains a conditional, e.g. at pairs of the form pp[ ððq[ rÞ[ sÞq and
pðp ^ ðq[ rÞÞ[ sÞq. IE, of course, predicts pairs of this form to be equivalent; and read-
ers may have noticed that both of the proofs above make crucial use of precisely this
instance of IE (in step (iv) of the ﬁrst, and step (v) of the second). This means that those
proofs would be blocked if we adopted a weaker version of IE, which says that the pre-
dicted equivalences of IE hold except when what is being imported or exported itself
contains conditional language:
24 See Khoo & Mandelkern 2018 for a survey. When it comes to subjunctive conditionals, however, things
may be otherwise, as Etlin 2008 discusses (thanks to an anonymous referee for this journal for bringing this
to my attention). Etlin provides the following pair (slightly modiﬁed):
(9) If this match had lit at noon today, then if it had been soaked in water last night it would have lit at
noon today.
(10) If this match had lit at noon today and it had been soaked in water last night, then it would have lit at
noon today.
(9) has a salient reading on which it is not true, while (10) has only a true reading; these together thus constitute
a prima facie counterexample to IE (and to RIE, the weaker principle I’ll take up in a moment) for subjunctives
—but not, significantly, for indicatives, since corresponding indicative pairs pattern together. One conclusion
we could draw from cases like this is that RIE is false for subjunctives, but true for indicatives. This would open
up two substantial explanatory questions: First, why do indicatives and subjunctives pattern differently here?
Second, why does RIE seem to hold in so many cases even for subjunctives? A different strategy would be to
argue that, appearances notwithstanding, (9) and (10) do not constitute a genuine counterexample to RIE. This
would avoid opening up those two explanatory questions. I will not try to adjudicate between these options here.
If we do ultimately reject IE and RIE for subjunctives, then the rest of the paper should be read as applicable
only to indicative conditionals.
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Restricted Import-Export (RIE):
8c : 8p; r 2 L : 8q 2 LCF : sp[ ðq[ rÞtc ¼ sðp ^ qÞ[ rtc
RIE says that pp[ ðq[ rÞq and pðp ^ qÞ[ rq will always be equivalent as long as q is
conditional-free; when q contains a conditional, these may come apart.
The ﬁrst thing to note about RIE is that it lets us escape the results presented so far:
that is, there is no difﬁculty validating RIE with a classical conjunction, together with
Nothing Added and Absurdum. Indeed, if we take either PM or PK and replace their non-
classical conjunctions with classical conjunctions, we arrive at semantic theories which
validate RIE but not IE; which validate Nothing Added and Absurdum, together with all
the background principles assumed above; but which do not validate Ex Falso or predict
an equivalence between p and pp ^ ð:p[ qÞq.
RIE thus lets us avoid the tensions pointed out above. RIE at ﬁrst blush looks hope-
lessly ad hoc. But this appearance is greatly diminished when we look at RIE from a
semantic rather than a syntactic point of view: as we have just seen, from the perspective
of certain theories of the conditional (like those given by PM and PK), there is a sense
in which it is simpler to validate RIE than it is to validate IE.25 And, more importantly, I
will argue that intuitions about natural language actually match the predictions of RIE:
conditionals pp[ ðq[ rÞq and pðp ^ qÞ[ rq are always felt to be equivalent, unless q
itself contains a conditional, in which case intuitions about their truth-values can diverge.
For the ﬁrst part of this claim, I refer readers to the existing literature. My contribution is
to the second part: when q contains a conditional, pp[ ðq[ rÞq and pðp ^ qÞ[ rq do
not invariably strike us as equivalent.
A variation on McGee’s case provides a nice illustration of this. Suppose that we know
that Reagan is well ahead of both Carter and Anderson in the polls, but we don’t know the
relative standing of Anderson and Carter. Now consider the following conditional:
(11) If a Republican will win the election, and Anderson will win if Reagan doesn’t
win, then both Republicans are currently in a stronger position to win than Carter.
(11) strikes me as likely true in the scenario as described. If a Republican will win the elec-
tion, presumably it will be Reagan, since we know he is in the strongest position to win. But if
it’s also the case that Anderson will win if Reagan doesn’t, then that must be because Ander-
son is in a stronger position than Carter at present. And so we know that both Anderson and
Reagan are in a stronger position to win than Carter: Reagan because we already know that
he’s ahead of Carter, and Anderson because the conditional fact that Anderson will win if
Reagan doesn’t, together with our background knowledge that Reagan is ahead, suggests that
Anderson must be doing better than Carter. (11), then, strikes me as likely true.
But now consider (12):
(12) If a Republican will win the election, then if Anderson will win if Reagan
doesn’t, then both Republicans are currently in a stronger position to win
than Carter.
25 Another indirect piece of evidence in favor of RIE is the fact that a similarly restricted version of MP
looks very appealing: namely, that fp; pp[ qqg entails q if q 2 LCF . In fact, the three theories intro-
duced at the outset all validate exactly this restriction of MP, despite invalidating MP.
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(12), unlike (11), does not seem likely to be true. After all, if a Republican wins the next
election, then of course it already follows that Anderson will win if Reagan doesn’t. And
so that embedded conditional doesn’t tell us anything more, beyond the assumption that
a Republican will win the election. In other words, (12) strikes me as being equivalent to
‘If a Republican will win the election, then both Republicans are currently in a stronger
position to win than Carter’. But that does not strike me as having any better than even
odds of being true: a Republican winning the election doesn’t show that both Republi-
cans are in a stronger position to win than Carter. In other words, the set-up described
by ‘If a Republican wins the election, then if Anderson will win if Reagan doesn’t,
then. . .’ seems clearly consistent with the following situation: Reagan is well ahead; then
Carter; and then Anderson. And in this situation, it’s not the case that both Republicans
are ahead. In short, my credence in (11) is very high; my credence in (12) is at best mid-
dling. If my credences in these can rationally come apart, then they do not express the
same proposition.
I conclude that (11) and (12) are not semantically equivalent. But now note that (11)
has the form pðp ^ ðq[ rÞÞ[ sq, and (12) has the form pp[ ððq[ rÞ[ sÞq—with
p ¼ ‘a Republican will win the election’, q ¼ ‘Reagan doesn’t win’, r ¼ ‘Anderson will
win’, and s ¼ ‘both Republicans are currently in a stronger position to win than Carter’.
That means that, if IE is valid, then (11) and (12) are semantically equivalent. And
indeed, McGee, PM, and PK all predict this equivalence, by validating IE—though in
different ways. McGee, by validating IE with a classical conjunction, predicts that both
(11) and (12) have the truth conditions which, intuitively, only (11) has—i.e. that both
conditionals are likely true in the situation as described. PM and PK validate IE by gen-
eralizing in the opposite direction: they predict that (11) and (12) both have the truth con-
ditions which, intuitively, only (12) has—i.e. that neither conditional is likely true in the
situation as described.
But, as we have seen, contrary to these predictions, (11) and (12) seem to mean differ-
ent things. And so IE is not valid; for if IE were, then (11) and (12) would be semanti-
cally equivalent. In particular, this divergence shows that IE fails for pairs of the form
pp[ ððq[ rÞ[ sÞq and pðp ^ ðq[ rÞÞ[ sÞq, just as RIE predicts. Conditionals, it
seems, cannot themselves be imported and exported salva veritate.
Pairs like (11) and (12) can be modiﬁed so as to target the importation direction of IE
rather than the exportation direction. Let’s revert to McGee’s set-up: we’ve just received
polling data that shows that Reagan is ahead, then Carter, and then far behind is Ander-
son. But now we’re not entirely sure whether the data are correct. Consider the following
conditionals:
(13) If a Republican will win the election, then if Anderson will win if Reagan
doesn’t, then the polling data we’ve just received are correct.
(14) If a Republican will win the election, and Anderson will win if Reagan doesn’t,
then the polling data we’ve just received are correct.
Here, it seems at least possible that (13) is true: the antecedents seem compatible with
the polling data being correct, since the data are consistent with a Republican winning
the election and Anderson winning if Reagan doesn’t under the supposition that a
Republican will win. By contrast, (14) seems clearly false: if Anderson will win if
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Reagan doesn’t, then the data we’ve just received, which show Anderson well behind
Carter, must be wrong.
Let me give, ﬁnally, another scenario which furnishes parallel counterexamples to IE.
Suppose that we hope to ﬁnd out about John’s preference ordering over apple, blueberry,
and pecan pie. We know that John prefers apple over both blueberry and pecan. We
don’t know whether he prefers blueberry or pecan. Then we overhear a different person
saying each of the following:
(15) If John will choose fruit, and he will choose blueberry if not apple, then he
prefers both apple and blueberry to pecan.
(16) If John will choose fruit, then if he will choose blueberry if not apple, then he
prefers both apple and blueberry to pecan.
My intuition is that, in this situation, (15) seems likely to be true, while (16) does not,
for parallel reasons to those given above.
Thus I am inclined to think that the right way to resolve the tensions I have identi-
ﬁed in this paper is the following. All the intuitions that have been adduced in the lit-
erature in favor of IE are in fact consistent with IE being invalid and just the weaker
principle RIE being valid. Moreover, contrasts like that between (11) and (12), (13)
and (14), and (15) and (16) show that IE fails precisely where RIE predicts it to:
when we import and export a sentence which itself contains conditional language. So
we should accept RIE instead of IE. Doing so lets us adopt a classical semantics for
conjunction, while still validating Nothing Added and Absurdum, without arriving at
the absurd conclusion that p:ðp[ qÞq entails p or that p and pp ^ ð:p[ qÞq are
equivalent. There are, again, many ways we could spell out an approach like this; two
options are obtained, again, by replacing the non-classical conjunctions in PM and PK
with classical conjunctions.
7. Conclusion
IE does not sit easily with classical ‘and’. I have illustrated this by showing that, if we
have classical ‘and’ and IE, there are two very natural principles which we cannot vali-
date, at risk of absurdity. I have argued that the best resolution to this puzzle is to reject
IE in favor of a slightly weaker principle, RIE, which better ﬁts data from natural lan-
guage and which allows us to hold onto both of those principles together with classical
conjunction.
Others may prefer to ﬁnd a different way out of this tangle; my main goal here has
been to identify a mess which so far has been passed over in digniﬁed silence.
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